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Over thirty years ago, Professor Malcolm Feeley published The 
Process Is the Punishment,1 providing what remains the classic account 
of the nation’s unceremonious treatment of individuals ensnared in a 
minor offense-dominated, high-volume urban court system.  As 
Professor Feeley demonstrated, when it comes to minor offense 
arrestees, the taxing, delay-ridden and confusing adjudicatory process 
itself is punitive, very often dwarfing the personal consequences of de 
jure punishment levied by the state.2  Unfortunately, despite the passage 
of time, recent work has made clear that the adjudicatory experience of 
low-level offenders has not appreciably changed for the better.3 
This past Term, however, in Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders of the County of Burlington,4 the Supreme Court allowed 
the pre-adjudicatory experience of minor offense arrestees to become 
significantly more intrusive in character. By a 5-4 vote, the Court held 
that such persons can be subjected to body cavity visual searches, 
 
† Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.  Thanks to 
Steven Ferrell, J.D. 2013, for his excellent research assistance.  
 1.  MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1st ed. 1979).   
 2.  Id. at 199. 
 3.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, 
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR 
COURTS (2009), available at http://www.nacdl.org/reports/; Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors 
Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 
(2011); Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1157 (2004).  
 4.  132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).  
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without regard for arrest basis or reason to suspect that they possess a 
weapon or contraband.5 
This symposium affords an opportunity to reflect upon the 
combined force of Florence and one of its foundational precedents, also 
decided by a 5-4 vote: Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.6  In Atwater, the 
Court afforded police explicit authority to arrest individuals for very 
minor offenses (there failure to wear a seatbelt) without a warrant, 
paving the way not only for arrests such as experienced by Albert 
Florence, but also a myriad of others, based on laws contained in state, 
local and federal codes.7  With Atwater, the Court refused to limit the 
governmental power to subject individuals to the trauma and 
inconvenience of arrest; with Florence, the Court significantly 
augmented the personal consequences of arrest, allowing visual 
inspections of individuals’ most intimate areas by jail personnel.8 
This paper starts with an overview of Florence, discussing its facts 
and holding.  Part II examines the critically important way in which 
Florence builds upon the already expansive discretionary authority of 
police to arrest individuals for minor offenses.  Part III and the 
Conclusion consider possible future developments. 
 
 
 5.  Id. at 1523.  
 6.  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).  
 7.  Id. at 342. 
 8.  To those familiar with the Court’s recent Fourth Amendment case law more generally, 
the result in Florence perhaps came as no surprise. Indeed, the facts giving rise to Albert Florence’s 
arrest afforded a microcosm of the Court’s modern inclination to back discretionary authority of 
executive actors. While the reason for the initial auto stop by police remains unknown, Florence 
suggested that it was because he and his wife (and their accompanying four-year-old child) were 
African-Americans in a BMW sport utility vehicle.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Florence, 
132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 220710 at *3.  Even if he was indeed stopped on the basis 
of this pretext, the seizure would have been permissible under the Fourth Amendment, based on the 
Court’s ruling in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996).  Subsequent to the traffic stop, 
Florence was informed by police that he was subject to arrest based on an outstanding arrest warrant 
for failure to pay a fine, and was in fact arrested on this basis, even though he told the arresting 
officer that he had long ago paid the fine and that the arrest warrant was therefore invalid.  See 
Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514.  Florence was thus like the petitioner in Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 
146, 149-50 (2004), who fruitlessly tried to rectify a legal misunderstanding by an arresting officer.  
Just as Alford showed the arresting officer an actual appellate opinion undercutting the legal basis 
for his arrest, Florence provided police proof that he had paid his fine, yet was still taken into 
custody.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 220710 
at *3. Under Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009), moreover, police can rely on arrest 
warrant databases that later prove to be mistaken. 
2
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I.  FLORENCE FACTS AND HOLDING 
Albert Florence’s travail began in March 2003, when the car in 
which he was riding, driven by his then-pregnant wife, was stopped by a 
State Trooper in Burlington County, New Jersey.9  Upon learning that 
Florence was the vehicle’s owner, the trooper conducted a database 
records search, which indicated that he was the subject of a bench 
warrant in Essex County, based on his purported failure to pay a fine.10  
Florence informed the trooper that the warrant was invalid because he 
had paid the fine within a week of the warrant’s issuance, two years 
before, and his wife presented a document showing proof of payment.11  
Without first attempting to verify Florence’s assertion, the trooper took 
Florence into custody by handcuffing him and transporting him to the 
police barracks.12 His later protestations of innocence were met with the 
response that only police in Essex County could rectify any error, and 
that in the meantime he would be taken to the Burlington County jail.13 
After arriving at the jail, Florence was required to remove his 
clothes and ordered to open his mouth, lift his tongue and arms, and 
elevate his genitals for visual inspection.14  Although no weapons or 
contraband were discovered, Florence remained at the Burlington jail for 
six days.15  During this time, officials made no effort to confirm the 
validity of the arrest warrant, and his family tried without success to 
secure his release.16  Florence eventually was transferred to Essex 
County, where he again was subject to search.17  He and four other 
detainees were ordered to a shower area and told to remove their clothes 
and, under the supervision of two officers, open their mouths, lift their 
genitals, and turn around, squat and cough.18 
 
 9.  The factual account provided is contained in the certiorari petition.  See Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at *3. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at **3-4.  No ticket for the alleged traffic violation was issued and the basis for the 
initial stop was never specified.  Id. at *4. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. at *5. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at *5-6. 
 17.  Id. at *6.  The policy of the Essex County facility required that persons arrested for any 
and all violations be subject to visual cavity searches, whereas the policy in Burlington County 
(consistent with New Jersey law) prohibited such searches unless the arrest was for a “crime” and 
there existed reasonable suspicion that the arrestee possessed a weapon, controlled substance or 
contraband.  Id. at **5-6.  Florence’s alleged misconduct, failure to pay a fine, constituted civil 
contempt in New Jersey, a non-criminal offense.  Id. at *4.   
 18.  Id. at *7. 
3
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The next day, eight days after first being taken into custody, a 
hearing was held before an Essex County judge who was “appalled” that 
the warrant for Florence’s arrest existed in the first instance and ordered 
his immediate release.19  Florence thereafter filed a federal civil rights 
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging his suspicionless strip searches 
by county officials on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.20  A 
federal trial court granted Florence’s motion for summary judgment,21 
and the Third Circuit reversed by a 2-1 vote.22  A circuit split having 
developed on the constitutionality of subjecting minor offense arrestees 
to suspicionless strip searches,23 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.24 
By a 5-4 vote, the Court upheld the Third Circuit, rejecting 
Florence’s constitutional claim.25 In an opinion written by Justice 
Kennedy,26 the Court commenced its analysis by emphasizing its 
precedent affording deference to prison and jail administrators in their 
operation of correctional facilities, including with respect to searches for 
weapons and contraband.27 Consistent with this position, the Court 
concluded that it would be “unworkable” to impose a requirement that 
any search of a minor offense arrestee must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion to believe that the arrestee was hiding a weapon or 
contraband.28 “People detained for minor offenses . . . turn out to be the 
 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id.  The suit was later certified as a class action involving individuals subjected to similar 
treatment in Essex and Burlington Counties.  Id. 
 21.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 519 (D. N.J. 
2009).  
 22.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 23.  Eight circuits, over the course of several years, condemned the practice of strip and/or 
body cavity searches.  See Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., Tex., 660 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc); 
Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2001); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir. 
1989); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1986); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1985); 
Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1984); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th 
Cir. 1983); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981).  Two circuits other than the Third 
Circuit found no Fourth Amendment problem with the practice.  See Bull v. City & Cnty. of San 
Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010); Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc).  
 24.  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011).  
 25.  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012). 
 26.  Justice Scalia joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion in toto, Justice Thomas joined in all but 
Part IV, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito filed separate concurring opinions.  Id.  
 27.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1515-17 (citing, inter alia, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 
(1984), Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984), and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).   
 28.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1520 (“It is reasonable . . . for correctional officials to conclude 
that this standard of [individualized reasonable suspicion] would be unworkable.”) (alteration to 
original); see also id. at 1522 (“The officials in charge of the jails in this case urge the Court to 
reject any complicated constitutional scheme requiring them to conduct less thorough inspections of 
some detainees . . . . They offer significant reasons why the Constitution must not prevent them 
4
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most devious and dangerous criminals,”29 Justice Kennedy observed, 
and authorities can lack reliable information on arrestees’ backgrounds 
and criminal histories.30 Furthermore, imposing a case-by-case 
requirement presented administrability challenges: “[Authorities] would 
be required, in a few minutes, to determine whether any of the 
underlying offenses [triggering arrest] were serious enough to authorize 
[a strip search] . . . . To avoid liability, officers might be inclined not to 
conduct a thorough search in any close case, thus creating unnecessary 
work for the entire jail population.”31 The Court had addressed the 
“analogous problem” in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, Justice Kennedy 
wrote, where it refused to require law enforcement officers in the field to 
distinguish arrestable from non-arrestable minor offenses; jail 
administrators have an equally “essential interest in readily administrable 
rules.”32 
In Part IV of the opinion, Justice Kennedy signaled that some future 
strip search scenario might raise constitutional concern, noting that 
“[t]his case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches 
that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will 
be held without assignment to the general population and without 
substantial contact with other detainees.”33  He also alluded to possible 
potential future concern over authorities “engaging in intentional 
humiliation and other abusive practices” and the “invasiveness of 
searches that involve the touching of detainees.”34  Such concerns, 
however,  were not implicated in Florence’s claim.35 
The two concurrences, filed by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito, agreed with the result and reasoning of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, 
but signaled some possible reservations.36  Chief Justice Roberts 
 
from conducting the same search on any suspected offender who will be admitted to the general 
population in their facilities.”).  
 29.  Id. at 1520 (noting, inter alia, the arrest of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh for 
a minor offense).  
 30.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1521 (“In the absence of reliable information it would be illogical 
to require officers to assume the arrestees in front of them do not pose a risk of smuggling 
something into a facility.”).   
 31.  Id. at 1522 (alterations to original). 
 32.  Id. (quoting Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001)). 
 33.  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522; see also id. at 1523 (“The accommodations provided in 
these situations may diminish the need to conduct some aspects of the searches at issue.”).  
 34.  Id.   
 35.  Id.  As noted, Justice Thomas signed on to all but Part IV of the Court’s opinion, 
suggesting that he would not be reluctant to reject a constitutional claim, even under such 
circumstances.  See supra note 26. 
 36.  Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1524-25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
5
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emphasized that the Court, in Part IV, did not “foreclose the possibility 
of an exception to the rule it announces.”37  He emphasized that 
“Florence was detained not for a minor traffic offense but instead 
pursuant to a warrant for his arrest, and that there was apparently no 
alternative, if Florence were to be detained, to holding him in the general 
jail population.”38  The Chief Justice concluded by offering that “[t]he 
Court makes a persuasive case for the general applicability of the rule it 
announces.  The Court is nonetheless wise to leave open the possibility 
of exceptions, to ensure that we ‘not embarrass the future.’”39 
In his concurrence, Justice Alito “emphasize[d] the limits of [the] 
holding”: that “jail administrators may require all arrestees who are 
committed to the general population of a jail to undergo visual strip 
searches not involving physical contact by corrections officers.”40  “As 
part of the inspection,” he added, “arrestees may be required to 
manipulate their bodies,”41 an experience he acknowledged as 
“undoubtedly humiliating and deeply offensive to many.”42  Like Chief 
Justice Roberts, he found no constitutional fault with the searches 
experienced by Florence and his fellow class members, but noted that the 
Court did “not hold that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip 
search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial 
officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the 
general population.”43 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, 
dissented.44  The dissent, unlike Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, 
took no solace in the purported narrowness of the Court’s opinion, 
reaching minor offense arrestees destined for the “general population” of 
a jail.45  The dissent emphasized the intrusiveness of strip searches46 and 
 
 37.  Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)).  
 40.  Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id.; see also id. at 1525 (“The Court does not address whether it is always reasonable, 
without regard to the offense or the reason for the detention, to strip search an arrestee before the 
arrestee’s detention has been reviewed by a judicial officer . . . . In light of that limitation, I join the 
opinion of the Court in full.”).  
 44.  Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
 45.  Id. at 1532. 
 46.  Id. at 1526 (“A strip search that involves a stranger peering without consent at a naked 
individual, and in particular at the most private portions of that person’s body, is a serious invasion 
of privacy . . . . Even when carried out in a respectful manner, and even absent any physical 
touching, such searches are inherently harmful, humiliating, and degrading.”); id. at 1528 (noting 
6
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noted that the scope of minor offense arrestees in the class action suit 
before the Court not only included Florence—arrested (erroneously) for 
failing to pay a civil fine—but also persons arrested for trespass during 
an anti-war demonstration, driving with a noisy muffler and riding a 
bicycle with an inaudible bell.47  Nor was the dissent persuaded that 
institutional or administrative needs precluded the Court from limiting 
searches to minor offense arrestees who pose a risk of possessing 
weapons and/or contraband.  The dissent pointed to studies finding very 
low rates of detection out of many thousands of strip searches 
conducted,48 the recommendations of professional bodies such as the 
American Correctional Association against suspicionless strip 
searches,49 and the use of a reasonable suspicion-based standard by 
entities (including the U.S. Marshals Service)50 and several states.51 
The dissent closed by sharing Justice Alito’s “intuition that the 
calculus may be different” for persons arrested for minor offense crimes 
not subject to judge-approved admission to the general jail population.52  
As far as the dissent was concerned, “[i]n an appropriate case . . . it 
remains open for the Court to consider whether it would be reasonable to 
admit an arrestee for a minor offense to the general population, and to 
subject her to the ‘humiliation of a strip search,’ prior to any review by a 
judicial officer.”53 
After Florence, individuals arrested for minor offenses can be 
subject to inspections of their most intimate bodily areas, without any 
particularized suspicion that they possess weapons or contraband, prior 
to being relegated to a facility’s “general jail population.”54  Despite the 
assessment of the dissent, and the guarded language of the two 
concurrences, it is not altogether clear what future set of facts might 
convince a majority of the Court to find a Fourth Amendment violation.  
Both concurrences (votes four and five of the majority, by Chief Justice 
 
that a strip search presents a “serious affront to human dignity and to individual privacy”).  
 47.  Id. at 1527.  
 48.  Id. at 1528-29. 
 49.  Id. at 1529. 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 1529-30. 
 52.  Id. at 1531. 
 53.  Id. at 1532 (quoting id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring)).  
 54.  The Court did not elaborate on the “general jail population” requirement, other than to 
mention that it was not required to “rule on the types of searches that would be reasonable in 
instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without assignment to the general jail 
population and without substantial contact with other detainees.” Id. at 1522.  It would appear, 
however, that unless an arrestee is placed in solitary confinement, there could be risk of “substantial 
contact with other detainees,” justifying application of  Florence.  
7
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Roberts and Justice Alito) deemed it important that the two New Jersey 
facilities had no available alternative to putting Florence in the general 
population,55 impliedly refusing to force such an alternative on them.  
Moreover, the searches experienced by Florence took place before a 
judicial officer had an opportunity to review his case, which Justice Alito 
stated might raise concern,56 a fact that for some reason did not prompt 
concern vis-à-vis Florence.57 
Finally, the Chief Justice’s point that Florence was detained not for 
a “minor traffic offense but instead pursuant to a warrant for his arrest”58 
affords little reason for civil libertarians to take solace. As the next part 
makes clear, a welter of minor offenses—not involving traffic—can 
trigger warrantless arrest, and arrest warrants (even valid ones, unlike in 
Florence’s case) fail to provide a significant constitutional limit.  
II. ARREST AUTHORITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
As noted at the outset, Florence builds upon the Court’s prior case 
law refusing to limit the discretionary authority of criminal justice 
executive actors, especially the Court’s 2001 decision in Atwater v. City 
of Lago Vista.59  In Atwater, a five-member majority of the Court upheld 
the authority of police, acting without a warrant, to arrest in public an 
individual for a fine-only offense (failure to wear a seatbelt while 
driving).60 The Court, as Justice Kennedy’s Florence opinion noted,  
rejected a case-by-case approach informed by whether arrest was 
justified under the particular circumstances,61 preferring instead to have 
 
 55.  Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (deeming it important that the two New Jersey 
facilities where Florence was strip searched had “no alternative, if Florence was to be detained, to 
holding him in the general jail population”); id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that a 
suspicionless strip search “may not be reasonable, particularly if an alternative procedure is 
feasible[,]” such as a segregation unit for minor offense temporary detainees).  
 56.  See id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring) (“It is important to note . . . that the Court does not 
hold that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention has not 
been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the 
general population.”). 
 57.  Presumably, this was because the New Jersey facilities did not have an alternative to 
placing Florence in the general population if he was to be detained.  See id.  As noted in the text, 
however, the Court found no constitutional fault with this absence, and did not require an 
alternative, allowing jailers to continue strip searches under the circumstances in Florence.  
 58.  Id. at 1523.  
 59.  532 U.S. 318 (2001).  
 60.  Id. at 354.  Under Texas law, violation of the law could result, at most, in a $50 fine.  Id. 
at 323 (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.413(d) (West 2011)). 
 61.  The Court rejected, for instance, any requirement that might turn on the relative gravity of 
the minor offense allegedly committed:  
It is not merely that we cannot expect every police officer to know the details of 
8
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the constitutional reasonableness of an arrest turn on whether probable 
cause existed to support an officer’s belief that a “very minor criminal 
offense in his presence” occurred.62 Ultimately, the Atwater majority 
questioned whether police authority to exercise discretion to undertake 
arrests for such offenses “need[ed] constitutional attention,”63 based on 
what it saw as the “dearth of horribles demanding redress”64 and its 
assessment that the country surely was “not confronting anything like an 
epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests.”65 
As I have highlighted elsewhere, the Court’s take on the actual 
empirical record at the time of Atwater fell well short of the mark.66  
Even based on reported case law, which surely understates the full nature 
and extent of arrests,67 the police commonly arrested individuals for a 
wide range of traffic (e.g., speeding, driving with a broken taillight) and 
non-traffic-related offenses (e.g., illegal parking, littering, riding a 
bicycle on a sidewalk, civil contempt based on a civil bench warrant (as 
in Florence), eating food on a subway, drinking in public, and underage 
drinking).68  Since being handed down in 2001, Atwater has often been 
invoked by state and lower federal courts to back police arrests of similar 
kind.69  Despite four members of the Court expressing “hope” shortly 
 
frequently complex penalty schemes . . . but that penalties for ostensibly identical 
conduct can vary on account of facts difficult (if not impossible) to know at the scene of 
the arrest.  Is this the first offense or is the suspect a repeat offender?  Is the weight of the 
marijuana a gram above or a gram below the fine-only line?  Where conduct could 
implicate more than one criminal prohibition, which one will the district attorney 
ultimately decide to charge?   
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348-49.  
 62.  Id. at 354. 
 63.  Id. at 351. 
 64.  Id. at 353.  
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte 
Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 419, 429-31 (2002).   
 67.  Id. at 430 (citing reasons including, inter alia, the common disincentive to pursue 
litigation in absence of long-term deprivation of physical liberty).  
 68.  Id. at 431. 
 69.  See, e.g., Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying New 
Mexico law) (violating a city ordinance for remaining in a public park after hours); United States v. 
Pratt, 355 F.3d 1119, 1123 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Missouri law) (jaywalking); Hudson v. State, 
No. CACR00-1013, 2001 WL 541069, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. May 23, 2001) (violating a city 
ordinance for remaining in a public park after hours); People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 71 (Cal. 2002) 
(riding a bicycle the wrong direction on a residential street); People v. Lambert, No. D052435, 2009 
WL 1091704, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2009) (driving a car with a hole in the car’s license 
plate); People v. Bybee, No. B171855, 2004 WL 1689782, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 29, 2004) 
(driving a bike against traffic); People v. Lopez, No. HO24173, 2003 WL 21942954, at *5 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Aug. 14, 2003) (possessing an open container of alcohol in public); People v. Fennell, No. 
B144396, 2001 WL 1190768, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2001) (making an illegal turn while 
9
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after Atwater that the Court would reexamine the outcome in Atwater if 
“experience demonstrates ‘anything like an epidemic,’”70 no such 
reconsideration has taken place.71 
In addition to figuring centrally in the Florence majority opinion,72 
Atwater has played a lynchpin role in the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence more generally.  Virginia v. Moore affords a critical 
example in this regard.73  Making ample use of Atwater as precedent,74 
Moore concluded that state statutory limits on police discretionary arrest 
authority for minor offenses (in Moore, driving with a suspended 
license) were immaterial for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Invoking 
Atwater’s “probable cause standard,”75 and reasserting the absence of 
any “epidemic” of “horribles” requiring redress,76 Moore dashed 
lingering hope that a non-constitutional limit might be brought to bear, 
suggested in Atwater itself.77 
 
driving); State v. Barros, 48 P.3d 584, 593 (Haw. 2002) (jaywalking); State v. Roche, 928 So. 2d 
761, 766-67 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (possessing an open container of alcohol in public); State v. 
Mercante, 836 So. 2d 596, 600 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (public urination); State v. Brown, No. 18972, 
2001 WL  1657828, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001) (jaywalking); State v. Wilkenson, 769 
N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ohio Com. Pleas. 2001) (driving a car with a non-working headlight); Brown v. 
State, No. 13-05-243-CR, 2006 WL 2025145, at *2  (Tex. App. July 20, 2006) (riding a bike 
without a headlight); ); Nicholson v. State, No. 05-00-01401-CR, 2001 WL 515919, at *3 (Tex. 
App. May 16, 2001) (driving with an expired vehicle registration sticker); Collins v. State, No. 14-
00-00814-CR, 2001 WL 664644, at *2 (Tex. App. June 14, 2001) (walking in a roadway).  In the 
District of Columbia, officers can arrest for 159 minor offenses including operating a radar detector, 
storing building materials in an alley, climbing a street lamp, and digging for fishing bait in Rock 
Creek Park.  See METRO. POLCE DEP’T, D.C., STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (Nov. 2005), 
available at http://www2.justiceonline.org/dcmpd/SOP-PD-Form-61D.pdf.   
 70.  See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773 (2001) (quoting Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by O’Connor, Breyer, and Stevens, J.J.). 
 71.  A handful of states, it is worth noting, have rejected Atwater on state constitutional 
grounds.  See, e.g., State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 361-62 (Minn. 2004); State v. Bayard, 71 
P.3d 498, 501-02 (Nev. 2003); State v. Rodarte, 125 P.3d 647, 650-51 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005); State 
v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 175, 176-77 (Ohio 2003). 
 72.  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517, 1522-23 
(2012). 
 73.  Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 74.  See id. at 171-76. 
 75.  Id. at 171 (“[W]hen an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a 
minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt.  The arrest 
is constitutionally reasonable.”); see also id. at 178 (“When officers have probable cause to believe 
that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the Fourth Amendment permits them to make 
an arrest, and to search the suspect in order to safeguard evidence and ensure their own safety.”).  
Notably, Atwater—decided in 2001—served as the anchor of the Moore Court’s reference to the 
“long line” of cases equating probable cause with constitutional reasonableness, the historical verity 
of which was justly questioned by Justice Ginsburg in her Moore concurrence.  Id. at 178-80 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).  
 76.  Id. at 175. 
 77.  Id. at 175-76.  In the wake of Moore, courts have refused to find that violation of other 
10
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In addition to having enormous practical significance, Atwater and 
its progeny beg the basic question of what can qualify as an “offense” 
sufficient to permit arrest, resulting in processing by the criminal justice 
system.  In Atwater, the Texas Legislature had expressly authorized (but 
did not require) police to arrest violators of the seat belt law,78 which the 
Supreme Court characterized as a “very minor criminal offense.”79  In 
Moore, on the other hand, the Court ignored the Virginia Legislature’s 
express denial of arrest power authority vis-à-vis driving with a 
suspended license, requiring instead that a summons be issued under the 
circumstances.80  Recently, courts have been asked to consider the scope 
of arrest authority relative to civil and quasi-civil violations of law,81 
pressing beyond Atwater’s already very low offense seriousness 
threshold.82 
In perhaps the most sweeping decision on the matter to date, the 
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Richard Posner, turned 
back a class action brought by individuals arrested for not paying 
parking tickets, sanctioned by a monetary penalty that could not even be 
classified as a fine.83 Judge Posner, relying on Atwater, wrote that 
“[e]ven arrests for violations of purely civil laws are common enough, 
and usually unexceptionable—examples that spring to mind are arrests 
for civil violations of the immigration laws (such as overstaying a visa) 
and for civil contempt.”84  Citing Moore, Judge Posner added that “[t]he 
Supreme Court has held that if an arrest is otherwise reasonable, the fact 
that it is not for an ‘arrestable’ offense does not make it 
unconstitutional.”85 
 
statutorily imposed arrest constraints, including relative to the geographical/jurisdictional reach of 
officers’ arrest powers, raise Fourth Amendment concern.  See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 553 
F.3d 1337, 1346 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Moore and rejecting impact of Colorado limit).   
 78.  See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001). 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Moore, 553 U.S. at 167. 
 81.  See, e.g., United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding arrest 
for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, a civil infraction under Nebraska law); United 
States v. Burtton, 599 F.3d 823, 827-28 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding arrest for open container 
violation, a civil infraction under Nebraska law); Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633, 638 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (upholding arrest based on arrest warrant for unpaid parking tickets, a civil non-jailable 
offense under Illinois law).  
 82.  The petitioner in Florence, it will be recalled, was arrested for the non-indictable offense 
of civil contempt; the constitutional validity of his arrest was not before the Court.   
 83.  Thomas, 580 F.3d at 634-39. 
 84.  Id. at 638.  As in Florence, the arrest of the main Petitioner was based on a faulty arrest 
warrant system: in Thomas, the arresting officer acted on the belief that the arrestee was “Joshua A.” 
when he was actually “Joseph A.”  Id. at 635.  
 85.  Id. at 637 (citing Moore, 553 U.S. at 174-75).  
11
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Whether such a position is defensible is open to serious question for 
as one federal trial judge observed “[t]he concept of probable cause 
makes sense only in relation to a criminal offense.”86  Nevertheless, 
while scholars have long debated the question of what conduct can 
qualify as a “crime,”87 doctrinal developments are in the process of 
mooting the practical importance of the distinction. 
Yet, in order to grasp the full extent of modern police arrest 
authority, other considerations must be taken into account. First, it is 
important to recognize that the constitutional sine qua non of any 
arrest—probable cause—is not only not susceptible of precise 
meaning;88 it is rather easy to satisfy89 and can be based on officers’ 
reasonable mistakes of fact.90 In addition, as a result of the Court’s 
decision in Devenpeck v. Alford,91 arrests can be based on grounds other 
than those identified by police at the time of arrest. The constitutional 
reasonableness of an arrest is based on “facts known to the arresting 
officer,”92 not her assessment of the precise legal basis for arrest.93  An 
officer’s “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the 
 
 86.  McKinney v. Fields, No. 07-cv-10652, 2010 WL 3583017, at * 6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 
2010).  See also Doe v. Metro. Police Dep’t of D.C., 445 F.3d 460, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding 
that a state statute that is unambiguously civil in nature cannot constitute a proper basis for arrest).   
 87.  See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987 (1940); 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958); see 
also Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL. L. REV. 335 (2000).   
 88.  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (noting that probable cause is a “fluid” 
concept “not readily . . . reduced to a neat set of legal rules”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 
690, 695 (1996) (“Articulating precisely what . . . ‘probable cause’ mean[s] is not possible”).  The 
Court has also haphazardly conflated probable cause with lesser standards such as reasonable 
suspicion and reasonable cause.  See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (stating 
that the substance of probable cause is reasonable suspicion of guilt).   
 89.  See Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1227 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
“probable cause itself is a relatively low threshold of proof”).  In addition, qualified immunity case 
law affords police added cushion to exercise their arrest discretion.  See Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 
183, 190 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven if the existence of probable cause were a close question, the 
‘qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments.’ Indeed, qualified 
immunity protects public officials from ‘bad guesses in gray areas.’”) (citations omitted). 
 90.  See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S 194, 206 (2001) (“Officers can have reasonable, but 
mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence of probable cause . . . .”); Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) (noting that factual determinations made by police need not 
“always be correct,” but they always must be “reasonable”); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 
(1987) (“[T]he Court has also recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest [factual] 
mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and 
executing search warrants.”). 
 91.  543 U.S. 146, 153-54 (2004).  
 92.  Id. at 152. 
 93.  Id. 155. 
12
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criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.”94 
Rounding out this authority, the Supreme Court has rejected the 
view that it has any institutional role in saying when codes become so 
“exorbitant” as to not justify enforcement.95  In a time when state, 
federal and local codes overflow with not just misdemeanors, but also 
countless malum prohibitum “violations” and “infractions,”96 threatening 
fines or very only brief jail terms,97 police discretionary authority has 
assumed paramount importance.98  While reliable data on the number of 
arrests for low-level offenses is notoriously hard to come by, we know 
that millions of such arrests occur annually nationwide,99 dwarfing the 
number of arrests for more serious offenses.100 
The numbers, however, risk understating the actual human 
consequences associated.  The personal  impact of being taken into 
custody in public is not to be understated,101 nor is the invasion of 
 
 94.  Id. at 153.   
 95.  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996).  See also Safford Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 391 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (specifying a “basic principle of 
the Fourth Amendment: that law enforcement officials can enforce with the same vigor all rules and 
regulations irrespective of the perceived importance of any of those rules”).  A question also 
remains regarding the historic common law requirement that a minor offense occur “in the 
presence” of an officer.  See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 341 n.11 (2001) (refusing 
to “speculate” on whether the requirement is of constitutional bearing, inasmuch as the seatbelt 
violation occurred in the officer’s presence, but stating in dictum that it “is not grounded in the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
 96.  For discussion of the often-overlooked role of local governments, in particular, in this 
regard, see Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1409 (2011). 
 97.  See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(3) (McKinney 2012) (“‘Violation’ means an offense, 
other than a ‘traffic infraction,’ for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen 
days cannot be imposed.”).  Such laws, it is important to note, enjoy a magnified scope of 
application based on the capacity of governments to enforce one another’s codes.  See Wayne A. 
Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1248 (2010).   
 98.  For discussion of the multi-faceted incentive structure driving such arrests see Wayne A. 
Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1584-85 (2012). 
 99.  See Table 29: Estimated Number of Arrests, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, F.B.I., 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl29.xls 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2012, 2012). 
 100.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, S. STRICKLAND, C. BROMAGE, S. GIBSON & A. 
MASON, NAT’L CTR FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS 
OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 47 (2010), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx (noting that misdemeanors 
comprised seventy-nine percent of court caseloads in eleven states studied).  
 101.  See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(describing arrest as “a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is guilty or 
innocent”); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (describing arrest as “a public act 
that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty . . . disrupt his employment, drain his 
financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in 
him, his family, and his friends.”); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (noting that 
13
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privacy102 attending the search that usually accompanies an arrest.103  
Moreover, today, an arrest often becomes the subject of public notice 
and ridicule as a result of for-profit published circulars and postings on 
websites containing mugshots.104  And, longer term, an arrest, even 
without conviction105 or prosecution,106 can serve as an obstacle to future 
employment107 and even result in an enhanced sentence in the event of 
future conviction.108 
Florence adds to this menu of consequences in an especially 
significant way.  Not only are arrestees subject to the often dangerous, 
scary, and unhealthy jail environment at the intake stage,109 but they can 
be subject to a close “visual inspection” of their naked bodies, without 
any reason to believe that the areas hide weapons or contraband.  Before, 
pursuant to the Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish only detainees having 
had “contact visits” with the outside public were subjected to the 
experience.110  Now, the mere status of being an arrestee makes one 
eligible.  To Albert Florence, quite understandably, the experience “was 
humiliating . . .  [making him] less than a man . . .  not better than an 
animal.”111 
 
arrest deprives persons of physical freedom, “the very essence of constitutional liberty”), abrogated 
by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).  
 102.  See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (acknowledging that “even a limited 
search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy.”) (citation omitted).   
 103.  See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident 
to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381 (2001).  In addition, it is becoming increasingly common 
for governments to require that arrestees provide a DNA sample.  See Logan, Policing Identity, 
supra note 98, at 1586-87. 
 104.  See, e.g., Vince Horiuchi, Your Mugshot Is Online; It Could Be Gone—For a Price, SALT 
LAKE TRIB., Sept. 6, 2011, available at http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home2/52450098-183/com-
mugshots-mugshot-florida.html.csp. 
 105.  See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978) (stating that “[a]n arrest . . . is a serious 
matter for any person even when no prosecution follows or when an acquittal is obtained.”).  
 106.  See Logan, Policing Identity, supra note 98, at 1589 (surveying data highlighting frequent 
non-prosecution of minor offense arrests).  
 107.  See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE 
L.J. 491, 520-21 (1985) (noting that applicants for professional licenses usually must acknowledge 
all arrests).  
 108.  See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(a)(2) (2011), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011_Guidelines/Manual_HTML/4a1_2.htm. 
 109.  See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & 
the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297 (2012). 
 110.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979).  
 111.  Adam Liptak, No Crime, But an Arrest and Two Strip-Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 
2011, at A17, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/us/08bar.html.  For judicial characterizations of 
the experience see, e.g., Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 2001) (referring to 
strip search as an “extreme intrusion” and “an offense to the dignity of the individual”) (citation 
omitted); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The experience of disrobing 
14
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Even more troubling, Florence affords no assurance that the power 
to subject individuals to the experience will not be marked by 
arbitrariness.  While Justice Kennedy’s opinion reserved judgment on 
“intentional humiliation and other abusive practices,”112 it is highly 
unlikely that such proof of subjective intent will ever be available to an 
arrestee.113  The Atwater majority freed police to subject persons 
suspected of committing minor offenses to the “pointless indignity” and 
“gratuitous humiliations” of arrest,114 in Gail Atwater’s case, by an 
officer who was a “jerk,” seemingly acting out of personal pique toward 
her.115  Florence, building upon Atwater, allows authorities to subject 
individuals to the far more intrusive and degrading experience of strip 
searches, without any suspicion whatsoever that they have weapons or 
contraband. 
Even if not motivated by personal animosity, such discretionary 
authority, as highlighted by Justice O’Connor in her Atwater dissent,116 
presents racial bias concern.  While the petitioner in Florence did not 
allege that his strip search in particular was racially motivated,117 arrest 
statistics showing huge disproportionalities of racial minorities being 
targeted for low-level offenses,118 often the result of police enforcement 
 
and exposing one’s self for visual inspection by a stranger clothed with the uniform and authority of 
the state, in an enclosed room inside a jail, can only be seen as thoroughly degrading and 
frightening.”); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983) (referring to 
strip search as “demeaning,” “humiliating,” and “terrifying”) (citation omitted).  
 112.  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012).  
 113.  Indeed, the Court’s focus on the subjective intent of individual executive actors itself is 
curious, as it is customarily ignored in the Fourth Amendment context.  See, e.g., Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996).  Intent is relevant, on the other hand, in the context of 
programmatic initiatives, such as roadblocks.  Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering 
Through Primary Purposes and Crime Control Agendas, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293, 299-327 
(2006).  However, it is hard to imagine that any jail facility policy would manifest intent to 
humiliate.  
 114.  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346-47 (2001).  
 115.  Oral Argument at 21, Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (No. 99-1408), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/99-1408.pdf (comment of 
Kennedy, J.).  
 116.  See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[A]s the recent debate over 
racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as 
an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual.  After today, the arsenal available to any officer 
extends to a full arrest and the searches permissible concomitant to that arrest.”).   
 117.  Florence did, however, suggest that his initial stop by police was possibly racially 
motivated.  See supra note 8.  It is also worth noting that that the record indicated that Essex 
County, New Jersey authorities, when subjecting Florence to his second strip search, possibly 
deviated from policy when they commanded him to “lift his genitals.”  Justice Kennedy noted, 
without elaboration, that it was “not clear that this last step was part of the normal process.”  
Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514.   
 118.  See, e.g., Andrew Golub et al., The Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana 
15
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strategies,119 present systemic risk of racialized strip searches.120 
Finally, Florence raises gender-related concerns.  Research 
suggests that authorities already single out females for more intrusive 
searches than males,121 and the experience of a strip search, even one not 
involving physical manipulation of genitalia to allow for internal view122 
or occurring when a subject is menstruating or pregnant,123 is a traumatic 
and humiliating event.124  That such trauma is aggravated in instances 
when a detainee has suffered past domestic or sexual abuse lends added 
cause for concern,125 especially in light of the known high incidence of 
such abuse among female detainee populations.126 
 
Arrests in New York City, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 131, 146 (2007) (noting that 74-91% of 
persons arrested in New York City between 1992-2003 for low-level marijuana offenses were black 
or Latino); Aleksandar Tomic & Jahn K. Hakes, Case Dismissed: Police Discretion and Racial 
Differences in Dismissals of Felony Charges, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 110, 138-39 (2008) 
(discussing study results showing disproportionate targeting of blacks, compared to whites, in street-
level discretionary enforcement of less serious offenses); see also Jim Dwyer, Whites Smoke Pot but 
Blacks Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at A24, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/nyregion/23about.html.  
 119.  See generally Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1171 (2011) (discussing confluence of geographic deployment, enforcement priority, and 
enforcement tactics accounting for demographic results).   
 120.  Cf. Tim Newburn et al., Race, Crime and Injustice?  Strip Search and the Treatment of 
Suspects in Custody, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 677, 679-85 (2004) (providing results of study in 
London showing disproportionate targeting of African-Caribbeans for strip searching).  
 121.  See Margo Schlanger, Jail Strip-Search Cases: Patterns and Participants, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 75-76 (2008) (noting that “quite a few cases allege that women are singled 
out for more invasive search procedures than men, perhaps because jail authorities believe that 
vaginal smuggling of contraband is easier (or more common) than anal smuggling, and therefore 
there is a greater need for highly intrusive searches of women.”).   
 122.  See, e.g., Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting 
experience of  detainee forced to “spread her labia . . . to allow a check of the vaginal areas”); 
Daphne Ha, Note, Blanket Policies for Strip Searching Pretrial Detainees: An Interdisciplinary 
Argument for Reasonableness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721, 2747 n.232 (2011) (noting recently 
discontinued use of a “labia lift” by Colorado Department of Corrections).  
 123.  See Schlanger, supra note 121, at 75-76. 
 124.  See Jude McCulloch & Amanda George, Naked Power: Strip Searching in Women’s 
Prisons, in THE VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION 121-22 (Phil Scraton & Jude McCulloch eds., 2009) 
(“Strip searches of women prisoners are experienced as a type of sexual coercion, which . . . 
undermines self-esteem and self-worth.”).   
 125.  See Brief Amici Curiae of Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project 
et al., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-945), 
2011 WL 2578559 at *5.  See also Ha, supra note 122, at 2740-43 (surveying  social science 
findings on distinct strip consequences for female detainees). 
 126.  Myrna S. Raeder, A Primer on Gender-Related Issues that Affect Female Offenders, 20-
SPG CRIM. JUST. 4, 6 (2005) (noting high incidence of reported sexual and physical abuse among 
female detainees, including 47% of those jailed).  
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss2/3
ARTICLE 3 - LOGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013  7:11 PM 
2013] FLORENCE V. BOARD 429 
III. LOOKING AHEAD 
In Florence, as Professor Carol Steiker observed on the day of its 
issuance, the Court took a “practice that was not universal and gave it its 
constitutional imprimatur.”127 In the absence of a federal constitutional 
limit,128 it is worth considering whether suspicionless strip searches 
might be limited by other avenues. 
First, as invited by the Florence majority, the political process 
could conceivably curtail strip search authority.129  Already at the time of 
Florence, several states imposed legislative limits on strip search 
authority, requiring that authorities have reasonable suspicion that 
arrestees are in possession of weapons or contraband.130  Whether these 
jurisdictions will maintain their policies, however, remains an open-
question.131  Knowledge of the public choice and political process 
dynamic operative in the criminal justice realm, however, does not give 
reason to be optimistic that such limits will  become more common, 
much less endure.  Indeed, it is worth recalling that Atwater invited a 
legislative limit on police minor offense arrest authority.  Yet, when 
acted upon by the Texas Legislature, the measure was vetoed by 
Governor Rick Perry amid strong law enforcement opposition.132 
A similar political dynamic can be expected with respect to strip 
searches, if the vigorous amicus efforts of corrections officials in the 
Florence litigation can serve as a gauge.133  It may be that the distinctly 
 
 127.  Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Oks Strip Searches for Minor Offenses, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO, Apr. 2, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/04/02/149866209/high-court-supports-strip-
searches-for-minor-offenders.   
 128.  For discussion of the quixotic hope of constitutional limits being imposed on policing 
more generally, see Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 768-81 
(2012).  
 129.  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1522 (2012) 
(noting that “individual jurisdictions can of course choose to impose more restrictive safeguards 
through statutes limiting warrantless arrests for minor offenders.”). 
 130.  See David M. Shapiro, Does the Fourth Amendment Permit Indiscriminate Searches of 
Misdemeanor Arrestees?: Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 6 CHARLESTON  L. REV. 131, 
154 n.115 (2011).  
 131.  See Totenberg, supra note 127 (noting that it remains to be seen “whether states that have 
forbidden this practice will now move to permit blanket strip searches of those arrested for minor 
charges.”).  
 132.  See Logan, Street Legal, supra note 66, at 448. 
 133.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae New Jersey County Jail Wardens Association in Support of 
Respondents, Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 3841659 (2011); Brief for 
Respondents Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington; Burlington County Jail; 
Warden Juel Cole, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Warden of Burlington County Jail; 
John Does 1-5 of Burlington County Jail, individually and officially, Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 
10-945), 2011 WL 3706116 (2011); Brief for Respondents Essex County Correctional Facility and 
Essex County Sheriff’s Department, Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 3739474 
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more significant personal consequences of Florence will galvanize 
public concern and motivate legislative action.134  However, Atwater too 
involved facts that resonated strongly with the public: an upper-class 
“soccer mom” arrested, in the presence of her crying children, for the 
fine-only offense of not wearing a seatbelt.135 
Alternatively, state courts, taking a page from Justice Brennan’s 
exhortation to look to their state constitutions to afford more in the way 
of civil liberty protection,136 could limit strip searches. Indeed, some 
state courts have disavowed Atwater, imposing a state constitutional 
limit on the power of police to engage in warrantless arrests for petty 
offenses.137 The vast majority of state courts, however, have aligned 
themselves with Atwater, again undercutting hope of similar judicial 
resolve in the strip search context.138  Finally, the human impact of 
Florence could well be mitigated by broader shifts in the criminal justice 
system, in particular, the move toward decriminalization and increased 
use of civil citations.  Jurisdictions, in keeping with recent urging of the 
American Bar Association,139 are showing increasing interest in slowing 
the influx of minor offense arrestees,140 which would lower the volume 
of strip searches.  Consistent with the broader “right on crime” 
 
(2011); Brief for the National Sheriffs’ Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 3584758 (2011); Brief of Current and Former Jail 
and Corrections Professionals as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 
(No. 10-945), 2011 WL 2593461 (2011).  
 134.  In a poll administered by researchers at Farleigh Dickinson University on the day 
Florence was decided, 65% of registered voters disagreed with the outcome, opining that jail 
officials should have individualized suspicion that an arrestee possesses a weapon or contraband 
before conducting a strip search, especially if the basis for arrest is a minor offense. FSU MindPoll, 
Nation Sides with New Jersey Motorist Against Court, Automatic Strip Searches, Apr. 3, 2012, 
http://www.ahherald.com/newsbrief-mainmenu-2/monmouth-county-news/12892-nation-sides-with-
new-jersey-motorist-against-court-automatic-strip-searches.   
 135.  See Logan, Street Legal, supra note 66, at 419-20 n.6 (noting widespread outrage on the 
nation’s editorial pages to Atwater’s outcome).  
 136.  See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).  
 137.  See supra note 71.  
 138.  See, e.g., Rankin v. Colman, 476 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. 
Nieves, 861 A.2d 62, 76-77 (Md. 2004); People v. Barnville, 819 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236-37 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2006); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 616-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Plemmons v. Pierce 
Cnty., 134 Wash. App. 449, 455-62 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).  
 139.  See The State Policy Implementation Project: Making Connections, ABA CRIM. J. 
SECTION NEWSLETTER (Am. Bar Ass’n), Spring, 2012, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/new
sletter_spring2012.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 140.  Id.  For discussion of the impact of the recent economic downturn on state and local 
criminal justice systems, see Matthew J. Parlow, The Great Recession and Its Implications for 
Community Policing, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1193 (2012).  
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movement,141 the shift has appeal for cash-strapped local governments, 
faced with the costs of housing and processing such arrestees, and has 
the added bonus of generating revenue.142  Looking ahead, it would 
appear that, strategically, it is by playing to this pragmatic motivation, 
more than any humanitarian impulse, that civil libertarians can most 
profitably dedicate their energies. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Florence, when combined with other Supreme Court decisions 
affording executive actors expansive discretionary power in their 
handling of low-level offenders, represents a singularly troubling 
development. It could be that sometime soon technological 
developments, providing a readily available, cheap and fail-proof means 
of searching the bodies of detainees, will overtake its practical 
significance.143  Yet, the stark constitutional reality remains that nothing 
in Florence necessitates that anything other than the intrusive techniques 
experienced by Albert Florence will be deployed in the nation’s jails and 
detention centers.144 
Two decades ago, the mere idea that a warrantless arrest detainee 
would be subject to pretrial detention for up to forty-eight hours, without 
judicial review of the legal propriety of the detention, inspired Justice 
Scalia’s ire: “Hereafter a law-abiding citizen wrongfully arrested may be 
compelled to await the grace of a Dickensian bureaucratic machine, as it 
churns its cycle . . . .  In my view, this is the image of a system of justice 
that has lost its ancient sense of priority, a system that few Americans 
would recognize as their own.”145 One can only wonder why similar 
outrage did not motivate Justice Scalia to join the dissent and change the 
outcome in Florence, a case in which an admittedly wrongly arrested 
 
 141.  See The Conservative Case for Reform: Fighting Crime, Prioritizing Victims, and 
Protecting Taxpayers, RIGHTONCRIME.ORG, http://www.rightoncrime.com/ (last visited Dec. 18, 
2012). 
 142.  The State Policy Implementation Project, supra note 139.  
 143.  Indeed, Florence, in his petition for certiorari directed the Court’s attention to the current 
use of technological advances, such as the “Body Orifice Scanning System” and full body scanners, 
avoiding need for strip searches, which went unacknowledged by members of the Florence Court. 
See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cty. of Burlington, Motion and Filing of Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari, 2011 WL 220710 *21-22 (Jan. 19, 2011).  
 144.  Cf. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) (noting that Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness of government activity “does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of 
alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.”) Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S 520, 559 & n.40 (1979) (expressing 
strong reservation over “less intrusive alternative[]” requirement in assessing reasonableness of 
visual body cavity searches of pretrial detainees following contact visits with outsiders).   
 145.  County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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citizen suffered a far more traumatic experience—a strip search.  Be that 
as it may, Justice Scalia’s account, juxtaposed against the facts and 
outcome of Florence, underscore the Court’s willingness to elevate the 
administrative interests of government over the privacy interests of 
minor offense arrestees. 
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